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Go Against the OddsAnew study shows that the brain sometimes invents visual contours evenwhen
they would be highly unlikely to occur in the real world. This presents
a challenge to theories assuming that the brain prefers the most probable
interpretation of the retinal image.Roland W. Fleming
How does the brain work out what is in
our surroundings from the information
on the retina? It’s a question that has
baffled scientists and philosophers for
over a thousand years [1]. The key
problem is that the retinal image is
fundamentally ambiguous. For any
given pattern of light that reaches our
eyes, there are many possible scenes
that could have created the image.
Somehow the brain has to overcome
this ambiguity and identify the one true
state of the world. But how? Most
researchers agree it would generally be
a good idea for the brain to select the
most probable interpretation of the
image. However, as reported recently
in Current Biology, Anderson et al. [2]
have found that this is not what the
brain always does.
Anderson et al. [2] created a motion
display that causes the brain to‘invent’ surface boundaries where
none exist in the image. That in itself is
not new: so-called ‘illusory contours’
have been discussed extensively since
the Gestalt psychologists [3–5]. But
here’s the catch. Usually, illusory
contours are the brain’s way of
rationally explaining the sudden
disappearance of some feature or
object. In our natural environment,
when something in the retinal image
ends abruptly, shrinks or disappears,
one of the most likely explanations is
that it is being hidden from view by
some other surface, a so-called
‘occluder’. When this occluder
happens to match the background (in
other words, when it is camouflaged)
then the occluder itself produces no
visible contrasts in the image. And this
is why the brain creates illusory
contours: it knows that the most
probable explanation of the
disappearing features is thatsomething (which cannot itself be seen)
is hiding them.
In the displays created by Anderson
et al. [2], however, we experience vivid
illusory contours even though the
occluding surface is already clearly
visible. In the centre of the display is
a clearly visible square occluder.
Surrounding the square, four circles
oscillate in and out, each one nudging
behind the square for a period during
the motion. When a circle moves
behind the square, a portion of it
disappears from the image because
it is hidden by the square. However,
despite the presence of a clearly
visible occluder that can fully account
for the disappearance of circles’
edges, observers experience an
additional illusory contour that
bulges and flexes over the top of the
square. This is surprising because
there is no rational reason for the
brain to invent an additional
occluder. The explanation for the
missing parts of the circles is
already visible, so nothing ought
to be invented.
The authors argue that this
finding has important theoretical
consequences. There is a long
tradition — dating back at least to
Helmholtz [6] — of theories that pose
perception as a process of
Image High probability interpretation:
one occluder
Low probability interpretation:
two occluders
Subjective percept
with illusory contours
C
A
D
E
B
Illusory surface
Improbable alignment
of two surfaces
at point of occlusion
Current Biology
Figure 1. Schematic depiction of the ‘improbable’ illusory contours in the moving displays by
Anderson et al. [2].
When observers view the motion sequence depicted in (A), we might expect them to experi-
ence it as in (B): a single square occluder in front of four circles. However, they actually expe-
rience an additional contour, as shown in (C) and (D) (dashed lines). As highlighted in red in (E),
this interpretation is highly improbable as it would require two occluding surfaces to cross the
edge of the circles at exactly the same points in the image.
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theories argue that, because the
image is ambiguous, the visual
system must somehow select one
of multiple — often infinitely
many — interpretations. Helmholtzand followers argue that the visual
system selects the interpretation that
is most probable, given the statistics
of the natural environment. The
modern formulation of this idea uses
Bayesian inference to represent theprobabilities of different states of the
world and to select the most probable
solution [7–14].
Anderson et al. [2] argue that, on its
own, purely probabilistic inference
cannot account for the perception of
illusory contours in their displays. As
depicted in Figure 1, the interpretation
of two occluding surfaces (one visible
directly, one ‘invented’ through illusory
contours) is substantially less probable
than the interpretation of a single one
(the square that is visible directly).
Therefore, as the authors suggest, to
explain the existence of this spurious
additional contour, theories of vision
also need to take into account
constraints imposed by how the
inferences are implemented in the
brain. In particular, they suggest that
the mechanisms involved in working
out occlusion are not the only ones
triggered by their display. Other
processes involved in estimating
surface transparency also play a role
in interpreting displays like these.
When these two different mechanisms
are brought into conflict, we can
experience spurious, improbable
percepts, as occurs here, with
illusory contours that do not explain
anything, but which the brain
invents nonetheless.
Might there be some way of
expressing this idea of ‘conflicting
constraints’ within a Bayesian theory
of the brain? Current theories
certainly cannot explain such
improbable percepts. However, truly
optimal inference would involve the
brain selecting the most probable
interpretation across all possible
conditions. The inference that gets the
answer right most of the time, may
still select an improbable solution some
of the time, because optimal inference
is a compromise between being as
flexible as possible and always getting
the answer right. Put another way,
optimal inference is not just finding the
most probable parameter values for
a single explanation of a limited set of
images. Instead, if the brain were
truly optimal, explaining the image
would also involve ‘model selection’,
that is, choosing which type of
explanation is appropriate for the
current image.
Modern Bayesian statisticalmethods
provide tools for ‘model averaging’, in
which multiple, qualitatively different
explanations of data are combined to
select the most probable explanation.
Might this be what the brain is doing
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R261here? It is interesting to speculate
whether the presence of these bizarre
additional illusory contoursmightmake
sense in terms of Bayesian model
averaging. Indeed, this is not as
different from the authors’ own
explanation as it may sound.
Essentially, when multiple models that
impose different constraints are
brought into conflict, sometimes the
globally most probable solution (the
solution that gets the right answermost
of the time) will produce the ‘wrong’
answer (a relatively improbable
answer) in a specific given case. Thus,
as Anderson et al. [2] argue, the
presence of the spurious contours
results from higher-level constraints
than those captured by a single
Bayesian model concerned only with
contour completion. Developing
theories that explain how the brain
resolves conflicts between different
kinds of explanation will not just shedlight on improbable contours. It will
also help us to understand the brain’s
supreme flexibility more generally.References
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A Kinetochore Missing Link Is FoundDuring mitosis the kinetochore assembles on centromeric chromatin. The
component that connects the chromatin-associated inner domain to the
microtubule-binding outer domain has eluded researchers. Two new studies
identify a conserved molecular linkage between the inner and outer
kinetochore.Thomas J. Maresca
The ultimate measure of a successful
cell division event is equal distribution
of the genetic material into two
daughter cells. At its most fundamental
level and in all eukaryotes, this requires
that replicated DNAphysically interacts
with spindle microtubules in
a configuration that best ensures each
daughter receives a copy. This is no
simple task. For one, the interaction
between the DNA and microtubules
cannot be static but rather capable of
channeling the energy of microtubule
dynamics and microtubule-associated
motor proteins into the alignment and
segregation of chromosomes. The
attachment site must also be able to
‘communicate’ with the cell if problems
in chromosome alignment arise so that
division can be halted and errors
repaired. These demanding
requirements are achieved by anextraordinary macro-molecular
complex called the kinetochore.
The kinetochore is a large
multi-protein assemblage that
localizes to specialized chromatin
regions called centromeres (reviewed
by [1]). Molecularly speaking, a subset
of kinetochore components, which
are referred to as the constitutive
centromere-associated network
(CCAN), are present at centromeres
throughout the cell cycle while other
kinetochore proteins assemble at
the centromere only during mitosis.
From a structural perspective, the
kinetochore has spatially distinct
domains that were initially identified
as separate electron-dense regions
or plates by electron microscopy. The
inner kinetochore is the DNA-proximal
interface of the kinetochore while
the outer kinetochore is the
microtubule-binding surface. Fittingly,
numerous CCAN components localizeto the inner kinetochore and directly
interact with DNA and/or centromeric
nucleosomes while the core
kinetochore microtubule attachment
complex (called the KMN complex)
assembles during mitosis and is
found in the outer plate.
A glut of studies over the past
decade has yielded a lengthy
kinetochore ‘parts list’ as well as
a comprehensive network of molecular
interdependencies that are required for
the localization of many of these parts.
With this strong foundation in place,
the field is quickly advancing towards
an extensive characterization of
kinetochore structure and function.
Two studies that appeared in a recent
issue ofCurrent Biology [2,3] have filled
a significant gap in our understanding
of kinetochore biology by identifying
the CCAN component CENP-C as the
missing molecular link between the
centromeric chromatin in the inner
kinetochore and the core
microtubule-attachment complex
in the outer kinetochore.
Both Przewloka et al. [2] and
Screpanti et al. [3] discovered that the
amino terminus of CENP-C mediates
interaction with the KMN network via
association with the Mis12 complex
(M in KMN) in Drosophila and human,
respectively. CENP-C was initially
identified as a component of the inner
